Tender is the Flesh Book Review

What happens when capitalism finally strips away every last pretense of civilization? What happens when human beings become just another commodity, their bodies reduced to inventory, their suffering transformed into profit, and their existence measured by their usefulness to the market?

Agustina Bazterrica’s Tender Is the Flesh offers a grotesque answer: nothing fundamentally changes. The language becomes more clinical, the machinery more efficient, and the violence more socially acceptable, but the underlying logic remains disturbingly familiar.

In this dystopian novel, a virus renders animal meat poisonous, forcing society to embrace the industrial slaughter and consumption of human beings. People are bred, processed, butchered, and sold as meat. An entire economy emerges around the practice, complete with factories, regulations, specialized labor, and consumers who would rather not think too hard about where their dinner comes from.

The premise is horrifying, but what makes the novel so effective is that its world isn’t governed by perpetual chaos. It is governed by bureaucracy. The slaughterhouses operate. The workers perform their duties. The wealthy purchase their products. The government establishes regulations. Society adapts. And that is precisely where the horror lies.

One of capitalism’s defining characteristics is its ability to transform the world into something that can be bought, sold, and exploited. Land becomes property. Labor becomes a commodity. Time becomes money. Human relationships become transactions. Even suffering can be packaged, marketed, and sold when somebody discovers a way to profit from it.

Tender Is the Flesh takes this logic to its most repulsive conclusion.

Human beings are no longer recognized as individuals possessing an inner life. They become products with measurable qualities, market values, and designated purposes. Their bodies are assessed, processed, and distributed according to economic demand. The distinction between a person and a product disappears, not because humanity has suddenly lost its capacity for moral reasoning, but because an entire economic system has been constructed around the financial benefits of pretending that certain human beings are no longer people. This is the terrifying brilliance of Bazterrica’s premise. The transformation doesn’t require everyone to become a sadistic monster. It requires people to accept a new category of commodity. Once that category is established, the machinery can take care of the rest.

The slaughterhouse isn’t merely a place of physical violence. It’s the logical endpoint of a worldview in which living beings possess value only insofar as somebody else can extract something from them.

What disturbed me most about the novel wasn’t simply its graphic depictions of brutality. It was the normalization of that brutality.

The characters inhabit a society in which atrocities have been incorporated into everyday routines. The language surrounding the industry is sanitized, technical, and impersonal. Euphemisms conceal the reality of what is happening, allowing people to participate in horrific practices without confronting their full implications.

Modern capitalist societies routinely obscure the human cost of their comforts. The exploitation of workers occurs far from the eyes of consumers. The suffering behind cheap products is hidden within global supply chains. Environmental destruction is treated as an externality. Poverty is reframed as personal failure, while wealth accumulated through exploitation is celebrated as success. The distance between consumer and victim makes indifference easier.

We are encouraged to see products rather than processes, prices rather than consequences, and convenience rather than the suffering that may sustain it. The system functions most smoothly when its participants can enjoy its benefits without examining its foundations. Bazterrica magnifies this arrangement until it becomes impossible to ignore. Her fictional society doesn’t eliminate violence. It industrializes it, regulates it, and gives it a respectable place in the economy. The horror isn’t that violence exists. The horror is that violence can become an ordinary job.

The novel also exposes how dehumanization can become a prerequisite for exploitation. If the victims are understood as fully human, the industry becomes morally indefensible. Their suffering becomes impossible to dismiss as a technical detail. Their existence challenges the legitimacy of the entire economic arrangement. So the system depends on distinctions: between those who count as people and those who don’t, between lives worthy of protection and lives available for consumption. These distinctions are not simply personal prejudices. They are reinforced through institutions, professional language, economic incentives, and social expectations.

Once an entire population is classified as a resource, cruelty can be presented as efficiency. Exploitation becomes production. Killing becomes processing. The moral question is replaced by a logistical one. How many units can be produced? How much can be sold? How can waste be reduced? How can demand be satisfied?

From an anarchist perspective, this is especially disturbing because it reveals how institutional power can organize domination until it appears natural. People learn their assigned roles, obey established procedures, and reproduce the system through everyday actions. Nobody needs to defend the entire arrangement every morning. They only need to perform their individual tasks.

Oppression becomes routine. And routine is one of the most effective ways to make the intolerable seem inevitable. The banality of evil and the machinery of obedience

There is something profoundly unsettling about the novel’s emphasis on procedure. The people operating this industry are not all depicted as extraordinary villains. They are workers, managers, officials, and consumers occupying recognizable social roles.

Their participation raises a question that extends far beyond the fictional world: how much cruelty can a society normalize before its members stop recognizing it as cruelty?

We often imagine that evil announces itself. We expect it to look monstrous, to speak openly about its intentions, to announce its hatred of humanity. But institutional violence rarely needs such theatricality.

It can arrive in paperwork, regulations, workplace expectations, and the reassuring claim that everyone is simply doing their job. It can be defended as necessary, profitable, legal, or unavoidable. People can distance themselves from responsibility by insisting that the system would continue without them.

And perhaps it would.

But that does not absolve them of their participation.

One of the novel’s bleakest implications is that civilization is not necessarily the opposite of barbarism. Civilization can provide barbarism with infrastructure. It can make cruelty more organized, more productive, and more difficult to challenge.

What makes Tender Is the Flesh such an effective anti-capitalist novel is that its central horror does not depend on the existence of universal hatred. The people being exploited do not have to be hated by every person who benefits from their exploitation. They simply have to be profitable. That distinction matters.

A system organized around accumulation does not need to recognize the intrinsic worth of the lives it consumes. It needs only to identify resources, establish ownership, organize production, and generate returns. Human suffering can become an acceptable cost when it is borne by somebody whose interests carry little economic or political weight. This is why the novel’s world feels less like an impossible nightmare than an exaggeration of existing tendencies.

Capitalism has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to adapt to moral criticism without surrendering its underlying priorities. It can market ethical consumption, celebrate corporate responsibility, and turn rebellion itself into a brand. It can acknowledge suffering while continuing to profit from the conditions that produce it. The system does not necessarily collapse when its contradictions become visible. Sometimes it simply finds a new way to sell them.

Bazterrica pushes that adaptability into the realm of the grotesque. Even the unspeakable becomes an industry.

The novel is also interested in the psychological consequences of living inside such a society. Its protagonist, Marcos, occupies a position within the very industry that makes the novel’s world possible. His private life and emotional struggles unfold against a background of organized human exploitation. This creates an uncomfortable tension between individual feeling and systemic violence.

Can a person remain compassionate in one area of life while participating in cruelty elsewhere? Can private grief or tenderness compensate for complicity in a brutal institution? Does an individual’s capacity to care for particular people mean much if they continue to benefit from a structure that treats others as disposable?

These questions resist easy answers.

We’re often eager to judge ourselves by our intentions, our private virtues, and the people we love. But institutions are sustained by actions as well as beliefs. A person can experience genuine tenderness without challenging the machinery of exploitation surrounding them. Compassion confined to the private sphere may offer personal comfort while leaving the public world untouched. That is one of the novel’s most uncomfortable challenges: whether our morality extends beyond the boundaries of our own lives, and what happens when it doesn’t.

Beyond its political critique, Tender Is the Flesh is a deeply existential work. Its world offers no comforting assurance that human beings are naturally moral, that civilization steadily improves, or that technological and bureaucratic sophistication represents genuine progress. Instead, it presents a society capable of organizing immense cruelty while continuing to regard itself as functional. The result is a particularly bleak vision of humanity.

Perhaps the most frightening possibility isn’t that people are inherently incapable of compassion, but that compassion is fragile when confronted with convenience, conformity, and material incentives. People can recognize suffering and still look away. They can understand that something is monstrous and still participate in it. They can construct elaborate moral justifications for arrangements that benefit them.

The novel doesn’t allow the reader the comfort of imagining that barbarism belongs exclusively to some distant, uncivilized other. Its monsters wear ordinary clothes. They have jobs. They follow procedures. They live in a society that has decided certain lives are worth less than others. And they eat dinner.

Tender Is the Flesh isn’t a political treatise, and it shouldn’t be reduced to a simplistic allegory in which capitalism alone explains every act of human cruelty. Its dystopia is also concerned with conformity, institutional power, moral compartmentalization, and the disturbing ease with which human beings adapt to the unacceptable.

Nevertheless, its central premise lends itself to a devastating anti-capitalist interpretation.

When everything must justify its existence through utility, when every resource must be exploited, and when profitability becomes more important than the lives sacrificed to achieve it, the distinction between a society’s productive capacity and its moral progress begins to collapse.

A society can become more efficient without becoming more humane. It can become wealthier without becoming more compassionate. It can develop increasingly sophisticated institutions while using those institutions to administer increasingly sophisticated forms of cruelty.

Progress measured exclusively through production, consumption, and economic growth is a profoundly impoverished definition of progress.

As an anarchist, I find the novel’s portrayal of normalized domination especially compelling. It exposes the danger of accepting institutions simply because they’re established, laws simply because they are enforceable, or economic arrangements simply because they are profitable. Legality does not make something ethical. Social acceptance does not make something just. And the fact that a system functions does not mean it deserves to survive.

The most horrifying aspect of Tender Is the Flesh isn’t the idea that humanity might one day become meat. It’s the suggestion that we could construct a world in which this happens, surround it with regulations and professional terminology, turn it into a source of employment and revenue, and eventually stop asking whether it should happen at all.

Capitalism’s ultimate horror is not merely that it can turn everything into a commodity, it’s that, given the right conditions, it can teach us to mistake the commodification of life for the natural order of things. And once that happens, the slaughterhouse no longer looks like an aberration.

It looks like business as usual.

The Rebellion Against Biology

In a previous post, I argued that much of human existence begins with an impulse that we rarely stop to question: the desire to reproduce. We inherit the machinery of sexuality before we are even capable of understanding it. We experience attraction, lust, arousal, and the urge to reproduce, and society generally tells us that these impulses are natural and therefore something we should embrace. However, natural doesn’t mean necessary, and it certainly doesn’t mean good.

Perhaps the more interesting question is what happens when we stop allowing our biological impulses to dictate the direction of our lives.

Sexual desire is extraordin arly powerful. It can occupy the mind, distort judgment, consume attention, and convince us that satisfying an impulse is somehow equivalent to finding meaning. We are constantly surrounded by messages telling us to pursue pleasure, find a partner, have sex, fall in love, reproduce, build a family, and pass ourselves into the future. And we still call ourselves free. But how much freedom exists when the organism itself is constantly issuing commands?

Eat. Sleep. Reproduce. Seek pleasure. Avoid pain. Survive. Continue.

These impulses are ancient. They existed long before philosophy, morality, religion, politics, or civilization. The human being arrives in the world already carrying the biological imperative to continue the process that produced them. Perhaps consciousness can be understood, at least in part, as the ability to look at these impulses from outside them.

I don’t mean that sexual desire must be violently repressed. Repression can become its own form of obsession. Someone who spends every waking moment screaming internally about how much they hate sex can still be dominated by sex. There is another possibility: detachment, that is, to experience desire without obeying it; to recognize lust when it appears and simply observe it. Understand an impulse can exist without becoming an instruction.

This is where abstinence becomes philosophically interesting. It ceases to be merely a question of morality or personal preference and becomes an experiment in consciousness. What happens when you deliberately refuse to participate in one of the most powerful mechanisms through which biology perpetuates itself? Perhaps nothing happens. Perhaps you simply become celibate. Or perhaps something changes.

The ancient ascetic traditions were fascinated by precisely this possibility. Buddhist thought examined craving as a source of suffering. Stoicism emphasized freedom from enslavement to passion. Schopenhauer regarded sexual desire as one of the clearest manifestions of the blind Will driving life to perpetuate itself. Various Christian traditions pursued celibacy as a means of redirecting attention away from bodily appetites and toward spiritual contemplation.

They came from radically different philosophical worlds, but they shared an intriguing question:

“What would consciousness become if it were no longer constantly pulled around by desire?”

Maybe what we call enlightenment isn’t the acquisition of some supernatural ability.

Maybe it’s subtraction.

Less craving.

Less compulsion.

Less attachment.

Less identification with the machinery of the body.

The modern world tends to assume that more pleasure means more freedom, but perhaps freedom isn’t the ability to satisfy every desire. Perhaps freedom is the realization that you don’t have to. You can want something without pursuing it. You can experience an impulse without obeying it. You can recognize the biological imperative without worshipping it. And perhaps this is where a genuinely different conception of consciousness begins.

We spend so much of our lives trying to satisfy the organism that we rarely ask what remains when we stop trying. If sexual desire is one of the mechanisms through which life reproduces itself, then refusing to participate in reproduction can be understood as a small act of philosophical rebellion against the biological imperative. Not because the individual is morally superior to those who reproduce, but because the individual has chosen to examine the machinery rather than automatically serve it.

There is something strange about being a conscious creature that can recognize the forces acting upon it. The biological organism says “continue.”

Consciousness asks “why?”

The organism says “reproduce.”

Consciousness asks “must I?”

The organism says “desire.”

Consciousness asks “do I have to obey?”

Perhaps that gap between impulse and action is one of the most important spaces human consciousness possesses. And perhaps the goal isn’t to destroy desire. Perhaps the goal is to become sufficiently conscious that desire no longer owns you. To become capable of looking at the oldest commands written into the human organism and simply saying: “No!”

Not out of hatred.

Not out of fear.

Not because someone told you that desire is sinful, but because you finally realized that an impulse is not an obligation. And if there is such a thing as a higher consciousness, perhaps it begins precisely there.

Absurdism and Anti-Natalism

I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about why people have children. The answers are almost always familiar: to leave a legacy, to experience unconditional love, to give life meaning, or simply because “that’s what people do.” None of these answers have ever satisfied me. The more I’ve read existentialist and absurdist philosophy, the more I’ve become convinced that having children doesn’t solve the problem of existence. It merely passes it on.

Albert Camus argued that human beings long for meaning in a universe that offers none. That tension — the collision between our desire for purpose and the world’s indifference — is what he called the absurd. His response wasn’t despair, but rebellion. We continue living, creating, loving, and searching for meaning despite knowing there is no cosmic guarantee that any of it matters. I admire that response. However, I don’t believe it follows that we should create new people to join us in that struggle.

Every person who is born will experience loss. Every person will know fear, disappointment, sickness, grief, anxiety, and eventually death. Even the happiest life can’t escape these realities. Joy exists, love exists, beauty exists, but so does suffering, and no one gets to choose only one side of the equation. When people say, “Life is a gift,” I can’t help but ask: “For whom?”

Before someone exists, there is no one waiting to receive that gift. There is no consciousness longing to be born. Birth doesn’t fulfill a need that already existed, it creates a person who will have needs, desires, frustations, and vulnerabilities that otherwise would have never existed. That doesn’t make life worthless. It simply means that creating life is not morally neutral.

I often hear that having children gives people purpose. I don’t doubt that’s true for many parents. But if our answer to existential uncertainty is to create another person who must confront that same uncertainty, have we solved anything? Or have we simply deferred the question? To me, meaning is something we create for ourselves, not something we outsource to the next generation.

This is why my anti-natalism isn’t rooted in pessimism or hatred of humanity. If anything, it’s rooted in compassion. I don’t look at the world and think people deserve to suffer. I look at the world and recognize that suffering is unavoidable, even in the best of lives. If I can prevent someone from experiencing that without depriving anyone who already exists, I believe that’s worth considering. Some will disagree, and that’s fine. These questions don’t have easy answers. They force us to examine assumptions that are so deeply woven into our culture that we rarely stop to question them.

Maybe that’s all philosophy is at its best: the willingness to ask uncomfortable questions.

For me, one of those questions is “If existence is an absurd struggle that each of us must navigate alone, why assume the answer is to bring someone else into it?”

I don’t claim to have the answer. I only know that, for me, creating another consciousness has never seemed like the solution to the silence of the universe.

Sometimes the most compassionate response to the absurd isn’t to ensure someone else experiences it. Sometimes it’s simply to face it ourselves.

Heart of Darkness from an Anarchist Perspective

Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness remains one of the most unsettling critiques of colonialism ever written. While the novella is often discussed in terms of race, psychology, or literary style, it also offers a powerful lens through which anarchists can examine the relationship between power, domination, and human corruption.

At its core, it’s a story about authority unleashed from restraint. The European powers claim to be bringing civilization to Africa, but Conrad quickly strips away this illusion. The colonial project is revealed not as a humanitarian mission but as a system of exploitation, extraction, and violence. The rhetoric of progress serves as a mask for the pursuit of ivory, wealth, and control.

For anarchists, this critique feels immediately familiar. States and empires often justify their power by claiming to act in the interests of civilization, security, or prosperity. Yet beneath these justifications lies coercion. The Congo in Conrad’s novella is not an aberration of imperialism but a logical consequence of concentrated power operating without accountability.

The character of Kurtz emodies this dynamic. He arrives in Africa with lofty ideals and grand ambitions. He is eloquent, educated, and apparently committed to humanitarian principles. Yet given near-total authority over his station and separated from meaningful social constraints, he transforms into a tyrant. The heads displayed on stakes outside his compound are not merely symbols of what happens when one individual gains unchecked power over others.

An anarchist reading rejects the comforting notion that Kurtz was simply an exceptionally evil man. The more disturbing possibility is that the structures around him encouraged and rewarded domination. The company admired him because he produced results. His brutality became acceptable as long as it served the economic interests of those in power. Kurtz is less a monster than a product of a system built on hierarchy and extraction.

Heart of Darkness also challenges the colonial distinction between “civilized” and “savage.” Throughout the story, it is the supposedly civilized Europeans who commit acts of extraordinary cruelty. Conrad suggests that civilization itself does not eliminate violence; it often organizes and legitimizes it. This insight resonates strongly with anarchist critiques of the state. Governments frequently claim a monopoly on legitimate violence, presenting themselves as guardians of order while engaging in warfare, repression, and exploitation on a massive scale.

At the same time, the novella is not a straightforward revolutionary text. Conrad offers little hope for resistance or liberation. His worldview is deeply pessimistic, often portraying darkness as an inherent aspect of human nature. Many anarchists would disagree with this conclusion. Thinkers such as Kropotkin argued that cooperation and mutual aid are just as natural to humanity as competition and domination. From this perspective, the problem is not humanity itself but the institution that concentrate power and reward exploitation.

This tension is what makes the novella so compelling. Conrad diagnoses the sickness of empire with remarkable clarity but remains skeptical that humanity can overcome it. Anarchists may accept his critique of authority while rejecting his pessimism about human potential.

More than a century after its publication, Heart of Darkness remains relevant because the questions it raises have not disappeared. How do systems of power corrupt those who wield them? How do institutions justify violence in the name of civilization? And what happens when economic interests are placed above human dignity?

Conrad doesn’t provide answers. He leaves us with Kurtz dying words: “The horror! The horror!” For anarchists, those words can be read as a final recognition of what lies at the heart of empire: not civilization, but domination.

Anti-Natalism is Not Class Hatred

Every time anti-natalism comes up in leftist spaces, the same accusation appears almost immediately: “So you think poor people shouldn’t have kids?” That’s not what anti-natalism is.

There is a massive difference between criticizing poor people for reproducing and questioning whether bringing anyone into existence is ethical under conditions of unavoidable suffering. Yet anti-natalism is constantly flattened into a caricature of eugenics, elitism, or “capitalist talking points.” That reaction often misses how deeply capitalism itself depends on endless reproduction.

Capitalism needs workers. It needs consumers. It needs renters, debtors, soldiers, and future laborers. A system built on perpetual growth requires a constant supply of new human beings to sustain it. Reproduction isn’t outside capitalism, it’s one of the mechanisms through which capitalism perpetuates itself. So when anti-natalists question reproduction, they are not necessarily attacking working class people. They are questioning the expectation that creating new life is automatically moral, necessary, or liberatory.

A common response from socialists and communists is that the real issue is material conditions. People suffer because capitalism creates poverty, insecurity, alienation, and exploitation. Therefore, the solution is not to discourage childbirth, but to build a world where people can thrive. Improving material conditions is obviously good. Fewer people suffering under poverty, medical debt, or homelessness is objectively preferable to the alternative. Anti-natalism asks a different question entirely.

Even in wealthy countries with strong social programs, people still experience grief, illness, depression, anxiety, aging, loneliness, and death. Even in ideal conditions, existence becomes packaged with loss and vulnerability. No amount of economic reform eliminates mortality or guarantees a meaningful life. The anti-natalist argument isn’t simply “the economy is bad.” It’s that existence itself imposes suffering on people who never consented to being born in the first place. That’s a philosophical argument, not a classist one. The distinction matters because people often confuse anti-natalism with selective breeding arguments. Eugenics says certain people shouldn’t reproduce because of who they are: poor, disabled, racialized, “undesirable,” etc.

Anti-natalism applies universally. It doesn’t target one class or group. The argument isn’t “poor people shouldn’t have children.” The argument is “creating sentient beings inevitably exposes them to suffering, and we should seriously question whether that is ethical at all.” Those are fundamentally different positions.

As a matter of fact, many anti-natalists are deeply critical of systems that pressure poor people into parenthood while simultaneously denying them healthcare, housing, childcare, and stability. Criticizing reproduction under oppressive systems is not the same as blaming oppressed people for existing within those systems.

Another issue is how deeply reproduction is romanticized across political ideologies. Conservatives frame childbirth as tradition and duty. Liberals frame it as fulfillment and personal choice. Even many leftists frame it as hope for the future or an act of resistance, but very few people interrogate the assumption that creating new life is inherently good.

There is immense social pressure to reproduce. People who don’t want children are often treated as immature, selfish, damaged, or nihilistic. Meanwhile, having children is treated as morally neutral or even virtuous by default, despite the fact that parenthood imposes life — and all its suffering — onto another person without their consent. Anti-natalism disrupts that assumption, which is why it provokes such hostility.

Human beings are biologically and socially driven toward reproduction, but inevitably it’s not the same thing as morality. People will continue doing many things that deserve ethical scrutiny. The fact that something is natural or historically common doesn’t automatically make it ethical. Anti-natalism isn’t a legislative project to forcibly stop reproduction. For most anti-natalists, it’s a philosophical position about harm reduction and ethical responsibility.

At its core, anti-natalism is often rooted less in hatred of humanity than in empathy for it. Many anti-natalists arrive at their position not because they despise people, but because they’re acutely aware of suffering, poverty, violence, trauma, disease, loneliness, exploitation, ecological collapse, and the quiet pain woven into ordinary existence. To them, refusing to impose life on another person isn’t cruelty. It’s restraint.

You don’t have to agree with anti-natalism to engage with it honestly. Dismissing it as merely “capitalist propaganda” ignores the deeper ethical question it raises: If life guarantees suffering, and no one can consent to being born, why is creating life treated as morally unquestionable?

On Remaining, Regrettably

I regret to inform you that I will not be dying today.

This is not out of hope, nor courage, nor any particularly admirable trait. Let the record show: I remain unconvinced by life’s supposed “beauty,” unmoved by its sales pitch, and deeply suspicious of anyone who describes it as a gift without including a receipt.

No, my continued existence is, at best, a clerical error I have chosen not to correct.
I have reviewed the arguments. I have read The Myth of Sisyphus and noted the insistence that one must imagine Sisyphus happy. I do not imagine him happy. I imagine him tired, irritated, and increasingly passive-aggressive toward the rock. And yet, he pushes.

Not because it matters. Not because it ends. But because the alternative would grant the universe a kind of victory it has not earned.

I have also consulted Emil Cioran, who kindly confirmed that existence is, in fact, a mistake. A relief, honestly. It’s nice to have that in writing. Still, even he lingered; complaining, observing, refusing to exit the stage he so clearly despised.
Which brings me here: not hopeful, not redeemed, but… present.

Let it be known that I do not stay for the usual reasons. Not for destiny, nor progress, nor the vague promise that things will “get better.” I stay out of curiosity, irritation, and a stubborn refusal to let absurdity have the last word.
If existence insists on being meaningless, then I will insist on experiencing it anyway. If only to document the failure.
I will drink bad coffee. I will argue with strangers. I will laugh at things that probably shouldn’t be funny. I will continue to observe humanity with a mix of fascination and disappointment, like a critic who refuses to leave a terrible play.

And yes, I will continue to wake up—begrudgingly, skeptically, but consistently.
Not as an act of faith.
As an act of defiance.
So no, this is not a farewell. It is, if anything, a protest. A refusal to resolve the tension. A decision to remain, not because life is good, but because it is absurd, and I am not finished mocking it.

Sincerely,
Someone who is still, inexplicably, here

The Strangest Thing About Being an Anti-Natalist

The strangest thing about being an anti-natalist isn’t the philosophy, it’s how angry people get about it. I’m not proposing laws. I’m not advocating forced sterilization. I’m not suggesting the state regulate reproduction. All I’m doing is saying I don’t think having children is ethically justified, and that I personally choose not to do it. Yet somehow that turns into accusations of eugenics, nihilism, fascism, or wanting to wipe out humanity.

This is interesting because the philosophy most people are actually arguing with — usually without realizing it — comes from thinkers like David Benatar, whose book Better Never to Have Been makes a pretty straightforward argument: bringing someone into existence exposes them to suffering to which they never consented. That’s it. That’s the core of it. And once you see the argument clearly, it’s hard to unsee.

Nobody consents to being born. That’s not rhetorical flourish. It’s just a fact. Every other major moral system we use in society revolves around consent. We treat it as one of the most basic ethical principles we have. Yet the biggest decision anyone will ever experience — the decision that creates their entire existence — is made without it.

Now, obviously, consent from a nonexistent person is impossible. Anti-natalism recognizes that, but that impossibility doesn’t magically make the ethical problem disappear. Instead it raises a question:

If creating someone exposes them to pain, illness, loss, anxiety, and eventually death … what’s the moral justification for doing it?

“But life is good!”

This is the first response. People say life is beautiful, meaningful, joyful. Sometimes it is. Anti-natalism doesn’t deny that pleasure exists. The argument is that pleasure doesn’t justify imposing suffering on someone who didn’t ask for the gamble in the first place. You can’t miss pleasures you were never born to experience, but if you’re born, you can absolutely experience suffering, and everyone does.

There’s also the eugenics accusation. One of the strangest criticisms I’ve heard over the past two days is that anti-natalism is a form of eugenics. This makes absolutely no sense. Eugenics is about selective reproduction. Deciding who should reproduce based on genetics, race, disability, or social status. It doesn’t say certain people shouldn’t have children. It says no one has a morally compelling reason to create new people at all. If anything, that’s the opposite of eugenics. Eugenics wants better babies. Anti-natalism questions whether creating babies in the first place is ethical.

Then there’s the whole “But what about the future?” This is another common argument that refusing to reproduce is defeatist. People say humanity needs future generations to fix the world. But this argument quietly assumes something strange: That the solution to suffering is creating new people who will inherit it. Imagine solving poverty by creating more poor people who might someday fix poverty. Imagine solving war by creating more soldiers. At some point the logic starts to look less like hope and more like a pyramid scheme.

The intensity of the backlash says something interesting. Anti-natalism isn’t just a philosophical argument. It pokes at one of the deepest assumptions our culture has: that having children is automatically meaningful, noble, and morally good. Questioning that assumption feels threatening. If reproduction isn’t inherently justified, then one of humanity’s most fundamental behaviors suddenly requires ethical scrutiny. That’s uncomfortable. So the response is often to attack the person making the argument instead of engaging with the argument itself.

At the end of the day, my decision to not have children doesn’t harm anyone. It doesn’t take anything away from people who wants families. But the philosophy matters because it forces us to confront a question most people never ask:

“Why do we assume creating life is morally neutral — or even good — by default?”

Maybe the answer is still yes. Maybe humanity keeps going forever. But if that’s the case, it should at least be a decision people think about seriously instead of treating reproduction as something automatic. If nothing else, anti-natalism forces that conversation. And judging by the reactions I’ve been seeing online the past two days, it’s a conversation a lot of people would rather avoid.

If the World is So Evil…

… why bring children into it?

We live in an age of relentless pessimism. People openly describe the world as corrupt, violent, exploitative, collapsing. Climate catastrophe is treated as inevitable. Political institutions are widely regarded as illegitimate or captured. Economic systems grind people down while enriching a few. Mental illness is endemic. War is normalized. Surveillance is constant. The future feels smaller than the past.

And yet, in the midst of it all, bringing a child into the world is treated as a moral good — often as the highest good — beyond question or critique.

This deserves examination.

If you sincerely believe the world is dangerous, unjust, and spiraling toward catastrophe, then procreation is not a neutral act. It is a decision to expose a new, defenseless person to conditions you already recognize as harmful. We should not knowingly drop a child into a burning building and call it hope. We should not place someone in a collapsing system and call it love. But when it comes to existence itself, the moral scrutiny vanishes. Why?

Because reproduction is culturally insulated from ethical analysis. It is framed as instinct, destiny, or sacred duty rather than a choice with consequences. Once an act is treated as “natural,” we stop asking whether it is just.

A child does not consent to being born. That is unavoidable. But what follows from that fact is rarely taken seriously. Once someone exists, they are compelled to participate in a system they did not choose: they must labor, obey laws, endure illness, suffer loss, and eventually die. Even the best possible life includes fear, grief, and pain. The worst lives include exploitation, abuse, hunger, and despair.

Crucially, non-existence deprives no one, while existence exposes someone to harm. This is a moral asymmetry people are deeply uncomfortable acknowledging, because it challenges one of our oldest assumptions: that life is always a gift. But a gift is something you can refuse. Existence is not.

“But they’ll make the world better!”

This is the most common defense, and it sounds noble. But it smuggles something deeply troubling into the argument. It assigns a moral burden to someone who does not yet exist. It treats a child as a future solution to problems created by adults, systems, and history. It converts hope into obligation.

If the world is broken, the responsibility to fix it belongs to those already here. Creating a new person in order to justify optimism is not hope, it is deferral. It is also a gamble. For every child who grows into a reformer, countless others will struggle to survive. Many will be crushed by the very forces they were supposed to redeem.

Another common move is to romanticize suffering. Pain becomes “growth.” Struggle becomes “meaning.” Trauma becomes “what makes us human.” This is easy to say when the suffering is abstract or belongs to someone else. But no one thanks their parents for giving them anxiety, grief, or an early death. No one looks back on war, illness, or exploitation and says, “I’m glad to endure that.” Meaning is something people construct in spite of suffering, not because suffering is good. To impose suffering without consent and then praise resilience is a moral sleight of hand.

Many people do not actively decide to have children. They drift into it. It’s what people do. It’s expected. Questioning it feels like questioning life itself, but default choices are still choices. And when the stakes involve an entire huma lifetime “I didn’t really think about it” is not an ethical defense.

Refusing to create life in a world you believe is dangerous is not nihilism. It’s moral restraint.

This argument is often misread as hatred of life or contempt for children. It is neither.

It is an attempt to take suffering seriously, to refuse to minimize it, normalize it, or pass it along out of habit or hope. It is a refusal to gamble with someone else’s pain in order to make existence feel meaningful.

If we truly believe the world is cruel, unstable, and unjust, the the most honest response may not be reproduction, but responsibility: caring for those who already exist, reducing harm where we can, and resisting the systems that make life so precarious.

Love does not require creation. Sometimes, love looks like restraint.

More Anarchist or Communist?

I’m firmly rooted in my beliefs as an anarcho-communist, but what does that mean? Am I an anarchist or a communist? How can one be both? Every political label has a built-in identity crisis, but few produce quite as much confusion as anarcho-communism. People squint at it like it’s a glitch in the ideological matrix: “Are they more anarchist or more communist? Which part matters more?”

Here’s the honest answer: you can’t pull the two apart without breaking the whole thing. Anarcho-communists aren’t halfway between the two. They’re the union overlap in the Venn diagram. Let’s break it down:

Anarchism: The Method

Anarchism begins with one foundational argument: hierarchy is not self-justifying. If someone claims the right to rule you, the burden of proof is on them. And good luck making a convincing case.

For anarchists, freedom isn’t something the state grants. It’s something the state obstructs. No kings, no presidents, no vanguards, no bosses, no landlords. Human beings coordinate their own lives without coercive authority. So when anarcho-communists talk about society without a state, they aren’t being edgy. They’re being consistent.

Communism: The Goal

Take the classic communist vision:

No classes

No private ownership of the means of production

No wage labor

No markets

No state

Marx called this the “higher phase of communism.” The endpoint. Anarcho-communists don’t disagree with that goal. They disagree with the path.

Where Marxists-Leninists picture a transitional state to shepherd you into communism, anarcho-communists see the contradiction immediately: You can’t build a stateless society by strengthening the state.

To them, that’s like saying the way to eliminate fire is to pour gasoline on it “temporarily.”

So which matters more? This is the fun part:

They’re anarchists in strategy and communist in outcome.

If you ask Marxist-Leninists then anarcho-communists are “too anarchist” because we reject the transitional state.

If you ask a market anarchist they’re “too communist” because we reject markets entirely.

If you ask an anarcho-communist then we’ll tell you the question is wrong. We see anarchism and communism as two sides of the same project: a society without domination, whether political or economic.

For us, you can’t be truly anarchist if you still allow economic hierarchy, and you can’t be truly communist if you preserve political hierarchy. Authority and exploitation are one machine with two gears.

So what’s the cleanest definition? Anarcho-communism is communism without the state and anarchism without the market. No bosses, no state, no landlords, no wage slavery, just cooperative, decentralized, freely associated communities handling things together.

The “more anarchist or communist?” debate only makes sense from the outside. From within, the two are inseparable.

Candide Through an Absurd and Anti-Natalist Lens

I finished Voltaire’s Candide. I bought it I don’t know how long ago, but I’d get distracted with other books as I often do and just forgot about it until recently. All I can say is “Wow!” It was an excellent satire of philosophy in general. Me, being who I am though, I read it through a lens of pessimism, absurdism, and anti-natalism. It’s surprisingly modern and disturbingly relevant.

Right from the start the main character — Candide — and his world are full of relentless misfortune: he starts out expelled from his home, pushed into a brutal army; he witnesses earthquakes, massacres, and hangings. Everywhere he goes, human cruelty and disaster dominate.

For someone like me that’s attuned to anti-natalist thought, the lesson is clear: life is unpredictably cruel, and no amount of idealism or hope can shield anyone from suffering. The character of Pangloss and his philosophy — “this is the best of all possible worlds” — is not comforting. It’s absurd. Voltaire mocks it precisely to show that optimism can blind us to reality.

Candide meets kings unthroned, slaves chained to oars, prostitutes forced by circumstance, and monks trapped in religious life against their will. From the sites of Libson to El Dorado and Paris to Venice, suffering is universal. It doesn’t discriminate by wealth, status, or virtue.

All of this perfectly aligns with anti-natalism. Why bring new life into a world so unpredictable, so cruel, and so universally painful? Voltaire’s stories of absurdly recurring disasters reinforce the ethical argument that procreation inevitably imposes suffering on others. Human ideas are fragile. Pursuits that seem meaningful such as love, wealth, status, and fame often collapse under the weight of reality. For an absurdist like myself, this is expected. The universe offers no inherent purpose and our “ideals” are more likely than not arbitrary constructs.

The end of the book says “We must cultivate our garden.” This is Voltaire’s practical work. Life is absurd and full of suffering, but we can still create meaning in small, tangible ways: tending to our responsibilities, helping others, or our own little personal projects. For an absurdist anti-natalist this means to me:

Accept the universe’s lack’s lack of inherent meaning. Do what you can to reduce suffering wherever possible. And focus on tangible, ethical, or creative work rather than abstract speculation.

So, what did I take away from the satirical work? I learned through its absurd coincidences, relentless misfortunes, and philosophical debates that it mirrors these truths: life is cruel, unpredictable, and often meaningless.

However, like Candide, we are not powerless. We can act, work, and cultivate our little gardens in such a chaotic world, and in doing so, carve out a fragile, ethical, and perhaps even joyful corner of existence.